

## CPAU Human Security Project

Quarterly Report: Kandahar Province, July - August 2010



**Front Cover:** *The map depicts the average Human Security score for Kandahar City (2.84), Arghandab (2.34) and Spin Boldak (3.36) in July 2010. Scores closer to 0 represent poor human security, scores closer to 5 indicate good human security.*

**Note:**

The Human Security Indicators Project was implemented by Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU). Data collection was carried out in 9 districts in 3 provinces in Afghanistan from January – March 2010. The sites include, Kabul Province: Kabul City, Kalakan and Surobi; Kunduz Province: Kunduz city, Imam Sahib and Ali Abad; Helmand Province: Lashkar Gah, Nad-i Ali and Garmsir. Data collection continued in these sites and expanded to 6 other districts in Kandahar Province: Kandahar City, Arghandab and Spin Boldak; Nangarhar Province: Jalalabad City, Surkh Rud and Muhmand Dara. Data from all sites was collected each month from April – August 2010.

This Quarterly Report aims to provide a comparison of three sites in Kandahar across the 25 indicators over two months from July – August 2010. The Quarterly Report is based on the Monthly Reports provided for each district. Additional Sectoral Papers focus on analysis and comparison of districts between provinces.

The Human Security Scores outlined in the report **do not** necessarily rank the same number of incidents, nor necessarily use the same respondent groups across indicators. An explanation of the respondent groups and questions asked is available in the Human Security Indicator Methodology Paper.

The scores from 0-5 are also relative to population sizes and are based on ranges outlined in the Human Security Technical Annex. Please note that a score close to 5 is considered to represent a good level of Human Security, a score close to 0 is a very poor level of Human Security.

### **Acknowledgements**

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# 1. Human Security Summary

- The security situation continued to deteriorate in Kandahar City and Arghandab in the third reporting quarter. Arghandab is arguably one of the least secure districts in Kandahar province and the situation declined markedly over the summer. The Taliban have had a visible presence in the district centre since July, where they collected *zakat* and issued decrees, including bans on working for the government or NGOs, or listening to music.
- Security within Kandahar City continued to worsen, with the Taliban exerting a strong influence just 4-5 km outside the city centre. Respondents reported kidnappings, killings and search operations in some parts of the city. In the Taliban controlled area north of the river, the insurgents operated a series of checkpoints, but as the Taliban are accepted by many people, these caused minimal disruption. Indeed, the relationship between the Taliban and the local population continued to be marked by mutual cooperation, notably owing to the need for residents to gain access to their garden plots.
- Security in Spin Boldak is comparatively good and indicators improved slightly. Elders appeared to be no longer the targets of threats and attacks. According to respondents, an agreement had been reached in July between the Taliban and the local communities, ensuring that the Taliban have open access to supplies coming from across the border (Karachi).
- Despite the poor security in the province, the price of public transport remained affordable throughout the last two reporting quarters. At the same time, the frequency of journeys remained low with little demand for transportation from customers, on the one hand, and drivers' frustration at disrupted journeys because of road blockages and checkpoints, on the other. Moreover, drivers have been forced to keep the costs of transportation low, despite the low frequency of journeys, in order to attract what is left of the diminishing customer base in this volatile security environment.
- Kandahar province continued to suffer from poor access to services. School attendance rates in Arghandab district have mostly fallen and many of the boys schools have closed. Health centres also lacked medicine and doctors, and the two open health centres in the district were clearly unable to meet demand. Thus, residents of Arghandab had to travel to Kandahar City in order to seek treatment.
- The insecurity prevalent in Arghandab and Kandahar City negatively impacted people's access to land, water and their ability to cope with adverse conditions. This often determined respondents' perceptions of shocks, as well as their overall economic situation. However, in Spin Boldak there were very few problems reported. The dominant concern of people is the lack of water for their land; drought has recently worsened this problem. Respondents also noted the high price of drinking water, which is unavailable with any degree of consistency. The lack of land and water frequently led to conflicts over these two resources.
- Food prices in Kandahar Province were exceptionally high. Due to the agricultural nature of the district and the small bazaar available, the market of Arghandab continued to be marked by a lack of certain items such as wheat, maize and beef. The price of goods in the central bazaar of Spin Boldak fell slightly since a spike in July. The bazaar was stocked with goods from Pakistan as much as from in-country, reducing prices in comparison to bazaars further from the border. In Kandahar City, high shop rental prices forced some shops to close down over the summer.
- Work opportunities were limited in Arghandab and labourers tended to travel to Kandahar City in order to seek employment. However, the high level of conflict began to affect the employment situation detrimentally within Arghandab, and the common consensus from respondents was that the situation was bad and getting worse. As a result labourers struggled to find work, with underemployment rates continuously higher than in Kandahar City or Spin Boldak.
- Overall, judicial and political security remained very low and often proved non-existent in Kandahar province. Elders and religious leaders in Arghandab are either inextricably linked to

the Taliban or they have fled the district to seek refuge in Kabul or Kandahar. The Taliban controlled the justice sector and had a strong shadow function, leaving limited space for the government.

## 2. Quarter 1: Indicator Scores & Analysis

### **Cluster 1: Personal/Physical security**

#### **Cluster 1 Analysis**

The security situation continued to deteriorate in Kandahar City and Arghandab in the third reporting quarter, with the indicators for attacks, threats and checkpoints on the rise. In Spin Boldak, however, security scores have been stable and much more positive. Arghandab is arguably one of the least secure districts in Kandahar Province and the situation declined markedly over the summer. The Taliban have had a visible presence in the district centre since July, where they collected *zakat* and issued decrees, including bans on working for the government or NGOs, or listening to music.

Despite a strong US presence, the Taliban used Arghandab as a base from which they were able to rocket Kandahar City. In response there has been bombing of the district by jets and open fighting. In July, the Taliban controlled the majority of the district without opposition. There was thus no need for nightlettering (*shabnameh*) or threats and the police continued to hide in sheltered guard huts equipped with armoured roofing. Only on the route from Arghandab towards Kandahar City were the police able to search people and extract bribes, particularly at Khesko. The lack of government and police presence also explains the low incidence of bribery for Arghandab in August, though respondents did indicate that government offices frequently demand bribes.

Security within Kandahar City continued to worsen, with the Taliban exerting a strong influence just 4-5 km outside the City centre. Respondents reported kidnappings, killings and search operations in the district 9 area, which is under firm Taliban control. The Taliban frequently administered threats and these threats were adhered to by the local population who lived in a constant state of fear. In the southern part of Kandahar City, respondents reported that the Taliban patrolled the area at night and from 5pm onwards there was no movement at all. Nightletters were prevalent, assassinations commonplace and Taliban frequently demanded the payment of *zakat*. Due to the lack of a functioning ANP, there was very little security in the district in July or August. The poorly functioning ANP was further inhibited by the bad behaviour of its members, with bribes extracted for minor misdemeanours, such as having two people on a motorbike. Reports of young boys being taken away by the police resurfaced once again; a worrying sign indicative of poor police behaviour.

In the Taliban controlled area north of the river, the insurgents operated a series of checkpoints in Shain, Babur and Charbulbee villages. However, these checkpoints caused minimal disruption as the Taliban are supported by people living in the region. Indeed, the relationship between the Taliban and the local population continued to be marked by mutual cooperation, notably owing to the need for residents to gain access to their garden plots.

Security in Spin Boldak is comparatively good and indicators improved somewhat. While in June and July focus group respondents reported that the Taliban threatened elders in particular, they appeared to be no longer the target of threats and attacks in August. According to respondents, an agreement had been reached in July between the Taliban and local people, ensuring that the Taliban have open access to supplies coming from across the border in Karachi.

In rationalising the decreased level of threats, respondents reported an improved security situation due to the role played by Abdul Raziq in Spin Boldak. Respondents expressed their agreement with the leadership of Abdul Raziq, because he has ensured positive police behaviour. Abdul Raziq is the border police commander and former warlord who led hundreds of fighters into Taliban-held villages in Kandahar, clearing them of insurgents. Apparently, local people respect and, more importantly, fear him despite various allegations of profiting from illegal customs dues<sup>1</sup>. His leadership goes some way to account for the low levels of bribery and threats (indicator 1.3).

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<sup>1</sup> See <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/25/AR2010102505658.html>

Moreover, overall crime levels were very low according to respondents and traders felt comfortable leaving their goods on the street at night with no concerns about theft.

### Cluster 1 Data

Indicator		Kandahar City				Spin Boldak				Arghandab				
		June	July	August	Change	June	July	August	Change	June	July	August	Change	
1.1	Attacks in district against International and national forces (-)	4.15	3.93	- <sup>2</sup>	-	4.53	4.34	-	-	-0.57	-9.24	-	-	
1.2	Threats by resistance groups (shabnameh: preaching in mosques) (-)	4.70	4.87	5.00	0.30	4.69	5.00	5.00	0.31	4.14	3.86	5.00	0.86	
1.3	Threats, intimidation and bribery by ANSF & government (-)	Experienced bribery, extortion , or threats by ANSF & government in the district / province in the last month	2.73	2.14	3.75	1.02	5.00	5.00	3.40	-1.60	4.00	5.00	5.00	1.00
		Heard about bribery, extortion, or threats by ANSF & government in the district / province in the last month	0.00	0.00	0.63	0.63	0.00	5.00	4.40	4.40	4.00	5.00	5.00	1.00
		<b>Total</b>	<b>1.36</b>	<b>1.07</b>	<b>2.19</b>	<b>0.82</b>	<b>2.50</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>3.90</b>	<b>1.40</b>	<b>4.00</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>1.00</b>
1.4	Violent clashes injuring/killing civilians (-)	4.89	- <sup>3</sup>	-	-	5.00	-	-	-	4.67	-	-	-	
		Q2	Q3		Change	Q2	Q3		Change	Q2	Q3		Change	
1.5	Number of checkpoints (-)	Number of ANSF/military checkpoints	4.66	5.00		0.34	4.40	3.99		-0.40	2.18	2.79		0.61
		Number of insurgent checkpoints	4.94	5.00		0.06	5.00	5.00		0.00	4.51	4.75		0.25
		<b>Total</b>	<b>4.80</b>	<b>5.00</b>		<b>0.20</b>	<b>4.70</b>	<b>4.50</b>		<b>-0.20</b>	<b>3.35</b>	<b>3.77</b>		<b>0.43</b>
<b>Cluster Total</b>		<b>3.98</b>	<b>3.72</b>	<b>4.06</b>	<b>0.08</b>	<b>4.28</b>	<b>4.71</b>	<b>4.47</b>	<b>0.18</b>	<b>3.12</b>	<b>0.85</b>	<b>4.59</b>	<b>1.47</b>	

<sup>2</sup> No data on attacks was available for Kandahar in August

<sup>3</sup> No data on civilian casualties was available for Kandahar in July or August.



## ***Cluster 2: Freedom of Movement***

### **Cluster 2 Analysis**

Freedom of movement declined in line with the deteriorating security situation in Kandahar City and Arghandab. In the last quarter, the three districts continued to be marked by poor access to services (both schooling and health care), low frequency of journeys on public transport, and fluctuating levels of population movement in response to extreme changes in the local security landscapes.

Despite the poor security, the cost of public transportation remained stable and affordable throughout the last two reporting quarters. At the same time, the increasing number of checkpoints, as well as the strong Taliban presence in the province, were both responsible for the very low frequency of journeys in July and August, giving a Human Security score close to 0. There appears to have been little demand for transportation from customers, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, frustration on the part of drivers due to road blockages and checkpoints which disrupt journeys. Moreover, drivers have been forced to keep the costs of transportation low, despite the low frequency of journeys, in order to attract what is left of the diminishing customer base in this volatile security environment. There were hardly any informal taxes reported for travelling along the road; however, this was due to the lack of police presence rather than to improved police behaviour. Despite some taxation at Murcha and Khesko, drivers in Arghandab district mostly managed to avoid these routes into Kandahar City, and using these detours did not encounter any bribery. They stated that the police had no power to extract bribes.

The sample sites in Kandahar province continued to suffer from poor access to services. School attendance rates in Spin Boldak as well as in Arghandab are alarmingly low. In fact, only a tiny minority of girls appears to attend school at all in the two districts. Over the last quarter, school attendance rates in Arghandab District have fallen for boys and risen marginally for girls. It appeared that the only school for girls in the district continued to be open despite the insecurity. However, many of the more abundant boys' schools have closed. In Tabin for instance the boys' school has been utilized as a base for the ANA. Health centres also lacked medicine and doctors and the two open health centres in Arghandab district were clearly unable to meet demand. Thus, residents of Arghandab had to travel to Kandahar City in order to seek treatment. This was only possible because the route to Kandahar City remained clear and open. Indeed, while schools also remained closed for the summer, the provision of healthcare services was one of the few positive aspects of Human Security in Kandahar City, and there were a number of healthcare options available for those with at least some assets, both private and public.

## Cluster 2 Data

Indicator		Kandahar City				Spin Boldak				Arghandab				
		June	July	August	Change	June	July	August	Change	June	July	August	Change	
2.1	Cost & frequency of public transport (to provincial capital) (-)	Afs / km	4.43	4.14	4.09	-0.33	4.30	3.94	4.07	-0.23	4.49	4.34	4.43	-0.06
		Number of journeys per day x number of cars servicing route	0.65	1.50	1.67	1.02	2.06	2.22	2.25	0.19	0.70	0.46	0.53	-0.18
		<b>Total</b>	<b>2.54</b>	<b>2.82</b>	<b>2.88</b>	<b>0.34</b>	<b>3.18</b>	<b>3.08</b>	<b>3.16</b>	<b>-0.02</b>	<b>2.59</b>	<b>2.40</b>	<b>2.48</b>	<b>-0.12</b>
2.2	Informal taxes for travelling along a road (-)	5.00	5.00	5.00	0.00	3.42	5.00	5.00	1.58	4.13	5.00	5.00	0.88	
		Q2	Q3		Change	Q2	Q3		Change	Q2	Q3		Change	
2.3	Number of children attending school (+)	School attendance (age 6-13) male, as percentage of potential attendance rates	- <sup>4</sup>	3.87		-	0.70	0.85		0.15	2.67	0.92		-1.74
		School attendance (age 6-13) female, as a percentage of potential attendance rates	-	1.60		-	0.20	0.21		0.01	0.03	0.07		0.04
		<b>Total</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>2.83</b>		<b>-</b>	<b>0.47</b>	<b>0.56</b>		<b>0.09</b>	<b>1.47</b>	<b>0.54</b>		<b>-0.94</b>
2.4	Number of patients using healthcare centres by population number (+)	0.17	3.37		3.19	1.16	1.16		0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	
		June	July	August	Change	June	July	August	Change	June	July	August	Change	
2.5	Returnee, IDP and migrant movements (-)	5.00	5.00	5.00	0.00	4.40	4.75	5.00	0.60	-2.05	5.00	5.00	7.05	
<b>Cluster Total</b>		<b>3.18</b>	<b>3.24</b>	<b>3.25</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>2.53</b>	<b>2.91</b>	<b>2.98</b>	<b>0.45</b>	<b>1.23</b>	<b>2.59</b>	<b>2.60</b>	<b>1.37</b>	

<sup>4</sup> School attendance data was unavailable for Kandahar City in June.

### **Cluster 3: Household Security**

#### **Cluster 3 Analysis**

Overall household security improved slightly over the third quarter, though the prevalent insecurity, particularly in Arghandab and Kandahar City, negatively impacted people's access to land, water and their ability to cope with adverse conditions. This often determined respondents' perceptions of shocks, as well as their overall economic situation. While water remained sufficient and coping mechanisms existed in Arghandab in August, it is clear that the tightening grip of the insurgency further reduced people's physical access to their land and garden plots. Gardens tended to be the site of mines and frequent threats.

The level of livestock illness and death was very low in August and had fallen since July. It is also notable that the overall size of livestock holdings was low. This may be indicative of families selling their livestock due to the poor security - this is alarming as it indicates the loss of an economic safety net. With increasing war in the district people's access to food has become limited, predominantly due to operations which left people bound to their houses for a number of days with depleted supplies.

In Kandahar City, no livestock was reported to have died or been ill during August, but livestock holdings are generally poor and livelihoods more influenced by trade and labour opportunities within the city. The percentage of households struggling to meet their food requirements remained very low in Kandahar City.

No natural shocks were reported by respondents in any of the three districts of Kandahar in August. However, people were clearly preoccupied with the high levels of insecurity, and their perception of shocks was heightened. The economic outlook of individuals largely stagnated during August as the on-going conflict restricted any gains that may have been made in employment or wages (see indicators 4.3 and 4.4). Household economic situations had already deteriorated to a very low level over the previous months of reporting. People continued to see their prospects as poor, predominantly due to the on-going conflict.

Spin Boldak presents a very different picture from the other districts in Kandahar. Overall there are few problems within the district. The dominant concern of people is the lack of water for their land; drought has recently worsened the problem. Respondents also noted the high price of drinking water, which is unavailable with any degree of consistency. The lack of land and sufficient water for irrigation frequently leads to conflicts over these two resources.

As a result of insufficient water supply, usable farm land was severely depleted, and there were few recognisable coping strategies to compensate for the loss. However, good work opportunities and a supply of goods from across the border with Pakistan meant that few families faced food shortages with any regularity. This indicator remained consistent during July and August.

The number of households facing shocks has reduced from July, but the dominant concern remained the drought-affected farmlands because of poor water supplies and the summer heat. No respondents felt that their economic situation had changed from July to August. Generally, however, the economic standing is higher in Spin Boldak than in surrounding districts.

**Table 1: Agricultural Seasons<sup>5</sup>:**

<i>Agricultural Activities:</i>	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
Land Preparation												
Planting												
Irrigation												
Weeding												
Harvesting												
Threshing/Storage												
Annual hunger periods												
Staple food purchase												
<i>Livestock activities:</i>												
Open range grazing												
Peak milking												
Sale of livestock												
<i>Other economic activities:</i>												
On farm employment												
Off farm employment												
Peak Trade												
Seasonal migration/remittance												

<sup>5</sup> USAID FEWSNET, Afghanistan rural livelihood profiles (zone 10: Southern Intensively Irrigated Cash Crop zone, p. 49), September 2005.

### Cluster 3 Data

Indicator		Kandahar City				Spin Boldak				Arghandab				
		June	July	August	Change	June	July	August	Change	June	July	August	Change	
3.1	Extent to which water supply meets crops requirements (+)	Households reporting sufficiency (%)	3.89	4.23	4.55	0.66	0.00	0.42	0.00	0.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	0.00
		Households reporting access to irrigated land (%)	1.73	1.35	1.80	0.07	2.75	2.60	3.13	0.38	2.08	2.88	2.17	0.09
		Households with coping mechanism (%)	5.00	0.00	5.00	0.00	1.67	1.82	1.00	-0.67	5.00	5.00	5.00	0.00
		<b>Total</b>	<b>3.54</b>	<b>1.86</b>	<b>3.78</b>	<b>0.24</b>	<b>1.47</b>	<b>1.61</b>	<b>1.38</b>	<b>-0.10</b>	<b>4.03</b>	<b>4.29</b>	<b>4.06</b>	<b>0.03</b>
3.2	Threats to livestock ownership (-)	3.83	4.88	5.00	1.17	4.92	4.89	5.00	0.08	5.00	3.23	4.90	-0.10	
3.3	Percentage of households consuming less than daily calorific requirements (-)	4.72	4.76	4.83	0.11	4.55	4.91	4.92	0.37	4.86	4.72	3.70	-1.16	
3.4	Impact of natural disasters (-)	5.00	5.00	5.00	0.00	2.00	2.78	4.29	2.29	5.00	5.00	5.00	0.00	
3.5	Perception of household economic situation (+)	1.58	1.45	2.39	0.81	3.41	2.50	2.50	-0.91	1.36	3.18	2.50	1.14	
<b>Cluster Total</b>		<b>3.74</b>	<b>3.59</b>	<b>4.20</b>	<b>0.47</b>	<b>3.27</b>	<b>3.34</b>	<b>3.62</b>	<b>0.35</b>	<b>4.05</b>	<b>4.09</b>	<b>4.03</b>	<b>-0.02</b>	

## ***Cluster 4: Economic (Trade/Business) Security***

### **Cluster 4 Analysis**

Concerning economic security, there is a marked division between Kandahar City and Spin Boldak, on the one hand, and Arghandab on the other, with each side often exhibiting opposite trends. This is related to the fact that in Arghandab agricultural production and on-farm labour is prevailing, while in the other two districts job opportunities are linked to trading opportunities and the bazaars.

Shop rental prices within Arghandab remained very low in Quarter 3 owing to the largely agricultural nature of the district and the small bazaar available, compared to Quarter 2 which saw a minimal increase in rates. Food costs remained at a very high level, though decreasing from their peak in June. The bazaar continued to be marked by a lack of certain items such as wheat, maize and beef, and shopkeepers no longer stocked many products as traders struggled to sell their goods. Shopkeepers had limited customers in the main centre but still pursued trade in the villages. The lack of shop trade caused profits to fall.

In Kandahar City, despite the overall slight increase in shop rental prices from the last quarter, some shopkeepers actually noted a fall in rental prices as the bazaar continued to be unprofitable. Shopkeepers had speculated that if overall trade remained low and insecurity continued, rental prices would go down to compensate for losses and keep the traders on the markets. The slight increase on average, however, is related to different traders and different sized plots within the same bazaar. Overall, prices remained high and the steep price of rentals, as well as continued insecurity, led some four or five shops to close down over the summer. The price of goods in the central bazaar of Spin Boldak fell slightly since a spike in July. Again it is apparent that the bazaar was stocked with goods from Pakistan as much as from in-country, and this tended to reduced prices in comparison to bazaars further from the border.

Work opportunities were limited in Arghandab and labourers tended to move to Kandahar City in order to seek employment. As the harvest period was still on-going there remained work for people in their own garden plots, and livelihoods remained relatively resolute. Wages increased slightly over the two month period and labourers appeared to be charging slightly more. However, the high level of conflict began to affect the employment situation detrimentally within Arghandab, and the common consensus from respondents was that the situation is bad and getting worse. As a result labourers struggled to find work, with underemployment rates continuously higher than in Kandahar City or Spin Boldak.

Work opportunities continued to improve alongside the security situation in Spin Boldak in Quarter 3 and the majority of respondents were able to secure work. The small drop, however, in availability during August was related to reduced work opportunities for labourers owing to the shorter work periods due to fasting. Traders, on the other hand, enjoyed full employment. The use of the district for transit and trucking continued to contribute positively to both economic opportunities and the security situation. However, the work opportunities on offer were poor and labourers tended to find jobs in private construction which were reportedly very dangerous. The demand for labouring roles was so high that it forced down wages, while labourers also found themselves on the receiving end of threats if they worked for NGOs or military projects. Both of these factors noticeably reduced their livelihood opportunities.

Work opportunities remained available in Kandahar City despite the insecurity, although conditions of work were dangerous, and this indicator has seen a slight improvement since July. Wage rates also remained roughly similar with a slight increase due to traders receiving more business during the month of Ramadan.

Wage rates within Spin Boldak remained very high (above the HS range) and the disparity in wage rates between labourers and traders was particularly stark. The bazaar and cross border trade offer abundant opportunities to make good money, while Ramadan has also created more internal trade.

For labourers, wage rates were closer to 250 Afs and their economic situation was evidently more fragile.

The availability of credit and frequency of loans have remained low within the province and accessibility generally declined province-wide by one or two points (indicator 4.5). While in Spin Boldak credit was needed less due to people's more positive economic outlook, in the other parts of the province high prices and high interest rates may have impacted on the uptake of credit. Moreover, high overall rates of inflation in Afghanistan in 2010 probably also lowered incentives for lenders to loan money. It appeared that most people who sought formal loans travelled to Kandahar City, and the social relations that previously provided forms of loans were now broken or geographically disparate. Similarly, in Kandahar City credit supplies continued to be dominated by informal structures of friends and relatives, with many recognising the difficulty of accessing credit due to the 'unislamic' nature of lending for profit. Many respondents with loans also reported the difficulty in paying back the amount due to the poor economic conditions within the city. Access to credit remained limited and, to a certain extent, was not required as heavily in Spin Boldak due to the optimistic economic outlook. The dominant credit was informal through social networks of friends and families; traders also appeared able to offer credit to customers and fellow traders at times. No formal mechanisms appeared established.

### Cluster 4 Data

Indicator		Kandahar City				Spin Boldak				Arghandab				
		Q2	Q3		Change	Q2	Q3		Change	Q2	Q3		Change	
4.1	Cost of shop rental (-)	2.98	2.14		-0.85	3.92	3.44		-0.48	4.68	4.54		-0.13	
		June	July	August	Change	June	July	August	Change	June	July	August	Change	
4.2	Price of a basic basket of consumer goods including fuels and agri inputs (-)	0.38	- <sup>6</sup>	-	-	2.07	1.47	1.92	-0.15	-3.99	0.87	0.19	4.18	
4.3	Availability of employment reported by casual & agricultural labourers (+)	3.74	3.67	3.96	0.22	3.93	4.42	4.08	0.15	3.35	3.93	3.33	-0.02	
4.4	Average daily wage (Casual/urban & agricultural) (+)	2.61	4.18	4.57	1.97	5.39	5.88	5.41	0.01	4.73	2.93	3.75	-0.98	
4.5	Access to credit (-)	Percentage of respondents currently with a loan (%)	4.06	2.50	2.19	-1.88	3.44	2.81	2.19	-1.25	3.13	1.25	1.88	-1.25
		Availability of informal credit; % of respondents that feel they have access to credit	2.00	1.50	0.75	-1.25	2.00	1.00	0.50	-1.50	3.25	0.75	1.50	-1.75
		<b>Total</b>	<b>3.03</b>	<b>2.00</b>	<b>1.47</b>	<b>-1.56</b>	<b>2.72</b>	<b>1.91</b>	<b>1.34</b>	<b>-1.38</b>	<b>3.19</b>	<b>1.00</b>	<b>1.69</b>	<b>-1.50</b>
<b>Cluster Total</b>		<b>2.55</b>	<b>2.40</b>	<b>2.43</b>	<b>-0.12</b>	<b>3.61</b>	<b>3.42</b>	<b>3.24</b>	<b>-0.37</b>	<b>2.39</b>	<b>2.65</b>	<b>2.70</b>	<b>0.31</b>	

<sup>6</sup> No CPI data was collected in Kandahar City during July and August.



## **Cluster 5: Judicial & Political Security**

### **Cluster 5 Analysis**

Overall, judicial and political security remained very low and often proved non-existent in Kandahar province. Elders and religious leaders in Arghandab are either inextricably linked to the Taliban or they have fled the district to seek refuge in Kabul or Kandahar. There were very few elders left in August and they all tended to be affiliated with the Taliban. The Taliban controlled the justice sector and had a strong shadow function, leaving limited space for the government. This was highlighted by the lack of election activity within the district despite the upcoming parliamentary elections in September 2010.

There were no *shura ulema* meetings in Arghandab in August, reflecting the lack of government influence in the area and also the precarious position of religious leaders, with all non-Taliban religious leaders being forced out. There is evidence that the Taliban run a *shura ulema* as part of their shadow governance structure. Similarly, in Spin Boldak there was no *shura ulema* in place. Religious leaders in Kandahar City noted that while the *shura ulema* did exist, they were not involved with it and it had no real function. For the fourth month in a row, religious leaders stated that the *shura* was just a name and that cooperating with the government was very dangerous.

Elders continued to receive very few cases throughout July and August and only played a limited role in Kandahar province. Significantly, religious leaders have lost the trust of the population in Arghandab district since July, despite them being active and attending many private meetings and events. They usually attended between three and eight such meetings but complained about the lack of invitations and involvements in official government and decision-making meetings. The huge increase in score can be explained by the markedly smaller constituencies represented by religious leaders questioned in August; between 65 and 150 households. The loss of public trust appeared to be related to the religious leaders only having a role in Islamic affairs and may be informed by the increased insecurity across the district. In Kandahar City the number of meetings attended by mullahs remained stable during August, while the level of public confidence fell after July. The role of mullahs appeared to be restricted to only Islamic affairs, and they had no interaction with the government.

Religious leaders in the city found themselves threatened from both sides (government and Taliban), while elders reported that they could only function if they negotiated their own space with the Taliban. Elders continued to receive a limited number of local conflicts from the households they oversaw. Indeed, in Kandahar both elders and religious leaders had a role in conflict resolution. The government, on the other hand, played no role due to bribery - this was demonstrated by the lack of contact and case sharing from the *Huqooq* to the local *shuras*.

Judicial and political security seems slightly more positive in Spin Boldak. The lack of land and water has led to frequent conflicts over these scarce resources and they tended to be solved by elders or the government. Indeed, there appeared to be some relationship between elders and the government with the district council having solved two cases in August. Nevertheless, elders played a very limited role in Spin Boldak overall, despite being the preferred conflict resolution mechanism. This is in part due to the large number of households each elder covers but may also be related to curtailed movement of elders having previously faced threats from the Taliban. Religious leaders remained trusted and utilised within the district and they appeared to have few connections with the Taliban who they do not support.

In Kandahar City, government behaviour is deemed poor. Government officials have been calling for shops and houses to be destroyed if illegally positioned and this has angered many residents. Moreover, while the government rules in Kandahar City during the day, they were reportedly not able to secure the area by night. Indeed, the Taliban control many areas in Kandahar City by night and people cannot leave their houses after 5pm.

There was only one official visit of elected provincial councillors to the district of Arghandab during August. It is not clear, however, what the nature of this trip was but it appeared to have had little impact in narrowing the gap between the government and the population as respondents continued to complain of the weakness of government, closed government offices and bribery in the district offices, as well as poor police behaviour, including harassing people and taking bribes at checkpoints.

The level of arbitrary detention fell in August throughout Kandahar province. This may reflect a shift in US tactics, even though they remained the main protagonists in carrying out such acts.

### Cluster 5 Data

Indicator		Kandahar City				Spin Boldak				Arghandab				
		June	July	August	Change	June	July	August	Change	June	July	August	Change	
5.1	Number of Ulema Shura meetings in district (+)	0.00	0.00	2.50	2.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
5.2	Number of visits to districts made by Parliamentarians and Provincial Councillors (+)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.71	0.71	
5.3	Number of new cases and decisions within informal justice mechanisms (+)	Number of new cases per/month/population	0.13	2.15	0.39	0.26	0.58	0.72	0.87	0.29	0.65	0.59	0.77	0.12
		Number of decisions in courts per/month/population	0.37	1.34	0.39	0.03	0.49	0.65	1.17	0.68	0.53	0.55	0.77	0.24
		<b>Total</b>	<b>0.25</b>	<b>1.75</b>	<b>0.39</b>	<b>0.15</b>	<b>0.53</b>	<b>0.68</b>	<b>1.02</b>	<b>0.49</b>	<b>0.59</b>	<b>0.57</b>	<b>0.77</b>	<b>0.18</b>
5.4	Engagement of religious actors in political and social decision making (+)	Number of consultative and decision making gatherings attended by religious actors per month/population	1.58	0.86	2.53	0.95	3.37	2.17	6.45	3.08	4.60	8.96	11.83	7.22
		Public perception of representativeness of Religious leaders; involvement in in Social & Development affairs	5.00	4.58	3.00	-2.00	4.38	3.50	4.29	-0.09	5.00	5.00	1.80	-3.20
		<b>Total</b>	<b>3.29</b>	<b>2.72</b>	<b>2.76</b>	<b>-0.53</b>	<b>3.87</b>	<b>2.84</b>	<b>5.37</b>	<b>1.50</b>	<b>4.80</b>	<b>6.98</b>	<b>6.81</b>	<b>2.01</b>
5.5	Levels of arbitrary detention (-)	0.00	0.38	2.00	2.00	5.00	5.00	3.13	-1.88	0.00	0.00	3.20	3.20	
<b>Cluster Total</b>		<b>0.71</b>	<b>0.97</b>	<b>1.53</b>	<b>0.82</b>	<b>1.88</b>	<b>1.70</b>	<b>1.90</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>1.08</b>	<b>1.51</b>	<b>2.30</b>	<b>1.22</b>	