

# Conflict analysis: Farza and Kalakan districts, Kabul province

---



Chris Snow, Christian Dennys and Idrees Zaman

CPAU March 2009



Cooperation for Peace and Unity

## Acknowledgment

The conflict analysis is one of 5 provincial studies focusing on Badakhshan, Kunduz, Kabul, Wardak and Ghazni conducted by CPAU with the financial support of Trocaire. The views expressed in the papers are the sole responsibility of CPAU and the authors and are not necessarily held by Trocaire.

The author would like to thank all those in Afghanistan who generously gave their time and effort to answer questionnaires; the other researchers on the project team for their invaluable feedback; CPAU staff in London and Kabul for their crucial work in collecting the necessary data; and Brendan Whitty, who facilitated my involvement and provided extensive background information.

Copies of this paper can be downloaded from [www.cpau.org.af](http://www.cpau.org.af)

For further information or to contact CPAU please email:

Idrees Zaman [idrees.zaman@cpau.org.af](mailto:idrees.zaman@cpau.org.af)

Christian Dennys [christian.dennys@cpau.org.af](mailto:christian.dennys@cpau.org.af)



## Table of Contents

1. Introduction .....	1
2. Definitions and Methodology .....	2
3. Conflict history in Kabul .....	5
Pre-1978 .....	6
1979 – 2001 .....	6
2001 – Present .....	7
Political Parties and actors .....	7
4. Shomali plain.....	8
5. Farza.....	9
6. Kalakan.....	9
7. Conflict Dynamics .....	10
Local Level Conflict Resolution .....	10
Seasonality.....	12
Other Actors and Conflict .....	14
Links between local conflict and higher level conflict .....	15
8. Dimensions of Conflict .....	17
9. Conclusion.....	18
Bibliography.....	19

## Table of figures

Figure 1 Causes of conflict in Farza & Kalakan – CPAU monitoring.....	12
Figure 2 Parties involved in conflicts in Farza & Kalakan – CPAU monitoring .....	12
Figure 3 Causes of conflict by month – CPAU monitoring.....	12
Figure 4 Parties to conflict by month – CPAU monitoring.....	13
Figure 5 Total parties to conflict – CPAU monitoring .....	13
Figure 6 Causes of conflict Security Database 1 (Kabul province).....	18
Figure 7 Causes of conflict Security Database 1 (Shomali Plain including Farza, Kalakan, Guldara, Qarabagh, Dih Sabz, Mir Bacha Kot, Istalif and Shakardara) .....	16

## **Glossary**

AMF	Afghan military forces
ANBP	Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme
CDC	Community Development Councils
CPAU	Cooperation for Peace and Unity
CCR	Crude Conflict Rate
CSO	Central Statistics Office
DDR	Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration
DfID	Department for International Development
DIAG	Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups
DRA	Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IAG	Illegally Armed Group
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDP	Internally Displaced People
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IGO	International Governmental Organisation
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
PTS	Programme Tahkim-i Sulh
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UXO	Unexploded Ordinance

## **Dari and Pashto terms**

Hizb	Party
Jirga	Council
Karez	Underground Irrigation channel
Shura	Council

Wolesi Jirga

Lower House of Parliament

### List of Parties

Hamnazar

Hizb-i Afghanistan Naween

Hizb-i Islami (Gulbuddin Hekmetyar)

Hizb-i Islami (Khalis)

Hizb-i Wahdat

Ittihad-i Islami (Sayaf)

Jamiat-i Islami Afghanistan

Jebha-i Nejat-i Milli

Junbesh-i Milli (Dostum)

Nihzat-i Milli

Sazman-i Azadeekhaw

Shura-i Nazar

People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)

Tanzim-i Dawat-i Islami-i Afghanistan (Sayaf)

United Front

## 1. Introduction

This report is a conflict analysis of two districts in rural Kabul, Farza and Kalakan in the Shomali plain, and uses various sources of data to discuss the trends and implications of local conflict. The main data set was provided by the records of Co-operation for Peace and Unity's (CPAU) Peace Councils between 2005 and 2008. Whilst the conflicts themselves are many and varied, they have been categorised by conflict types and by parties to the conflict so that common sources of conflict can be identified. The cases at the district level form a localised picture of the conflict environment, and this snapshot has been compared to provincial level conflict data in order to identify links within and between conflicts. In addition secondary data including historical information about local politics, conflict, social and economic issues were used to place the data in context, trying to draw out some of the causes of current disputes, and make recommendations for future research work and the continuing work of the Peace Councils.

With the appropriate caveats, some broad conclusions can be drawn about the nature of conflict in the two districts. At the district level, conflicts over land and water are by far the most frequently addressed by the Peace Councils. Local conflicts seen by the Peace Councils are almost always low-intensity and non-fatal, and also include disputes over marriages, debt and, very infrequently, cases concerning blood feuds.

There has been an increase in the number of conflicts addressed by the councils in the two districts in 2008. This indicates the severity of existing local conflict in Kalakan (to which the project moved in late 2007) as well as the ability of the councils to address some forms of local conflict. Higher level conflict has not been a particular feature of either district, though Kalakan's proximity to the main Kabul highway allows the district to be brought in to wider conflict dynamics, including drugs.

Whilst there is a history of political parties in the area it seems that the proximity to Kabul has had two significant impacts on local conflict in the area. Kabul city attracts the focus of higher order conflict (particularly the insurgency) leaving these districts relatively calm. Secondly, local groups seem to be concerned about maintaining security and playing down local conflicts as a way of improving their economic or political opportunities. This has led to a proactive stance in terms of attempting local level conflict resolution by local elders and local government.

## 2. Definitions and Methodology

### Definitions

The definitions applied in this project reflect the perception of conflict as defined by the Peace Councils. This has been adopted in place of an externally applied definition so as to reflect an Afghan interpretation of their experiences of conflict. This led to several categorical and definitional challenges and therefore coding of conflicts, who was involved and what was the cause of the conflict have been driven by what the councils reported rather than a pre-defined list set by CPAU. This step is crucial to the process of understanding what conflict is in Afghanistan.

### Conflict

'Conflict' in the context of this study is an incident that has been brought to a Peace Council run by CPAU in the districts under investigation. The range of conflicts is diverse, including everything from fights over parking; access to pasture land; control of water resources; domestic violence; kidnapping; murder; debt amongst others. Further conflicts are not recorded in terms of the number of times they are brought to a council for resolution, nor the length of the conflict (though some records note that conflicts have been present for a number of years). In addition the councils do not record whether this is a conflict that had been addressed by another body, or been considered dormant by the parties.

These limitations mean that we cannot make any judgments on how many times the Peace Council must meet to address a conflict, how long conflicts last or what is the rate at which they are dormant but then re-emerge at a later date. These are issues that could be looked at in future studies but are beyond the ability of the current data-set.

### Parties

'Parties' to the conflict recorded are individuals or groups that are directly engaged in the conflict. The councils recorded not only the individuals involved but also their affiliation and relation to other parties in the conflicts, including both individual and communal groups. The team created a separation between conflicts within families (intra-family), between 2 families (inter-family), between families in the same community (intra-community) and finally between different communities (inter-community).

### Cause

Conflict is often caused by more than one factor, and conflicts can continue over many episodes (see definition above). When the data was collected the councils were asked to identify the *primary* reason or cause for the conflict that they recorded. The team then formed categories based on the themes that came out from the data. They include conflicts caused by water, land, weddings/marriages, debt/financial, murder/blood feud and domestic violence. These 6 categories captured 82% of the conflicts recorded. Another category of 28 'other' conflicts was created as well as one for the 18 'interpersonal' conflicts (11% and 7% respectively of the total included in the data set). The 'interpersonal' conflicts were all recorded in one district and 'other/interpersonal' is considered one category in the analysis – though the reason why one district would have a large number of different interpersonal conflicts should be investigated further.

### Conflict rate

The 'conflict rate' that is applied in some of the quantitative data analysis and graphs is based on the calculation of crude mortality rates used in humanitarian situations such as refugee camps to identify the severity of the health issues facing a community. The rationale behind the use of the 'crude conflict rate' is to address some of the perennial data issues in Afghanistan. Firstly, there is an extreme variation in population sizes between districts – within this sample alone the range is from 15,000 – 249,000. Secondly, simple counting of conflicts provides no indication about how severe a situation could be. As an example we could imagine the report 'a car accident on a road killed 3 people and injured 7'. The accident itself doesn't tell us

anything about how dangerous the area where the accident happened actually is. Is it a one off accident, or the latest in a series of accidents?

Similarly, in an example using conflict, if there are 15 cases of conflict in a district with 250,000 people how do we know whether or not this is as severe as 15 conflict cases in a district with 15,000 people? This indicates how simple reporting of conflicts tells us very little which is why, for the purposes of the project, we devised a Crude Conflict Rate to provide some empirical basis for qualitative and quantitative data.

The crude conflict rate indicates severity allowing greater comparability between districts with differing populations. By indicating severity over time we can also identify which conflicts are affected by other conflict drivers. Replacing deaths with 'conflicts' results in the following calculation;

$$\text{Crude Conflict Rate (CCR)} = \frac{\text{No of conflicts} \times \text{Population of District}}{100,000}$$

The 'crude' in the title is important – this is a crude indicator, and conflict is not as finite as mortality, so caution should be exercised in taking the analysis too far. This is particularly important because the CCR does not differentiate the seriousness between the different causes or parties – a murder is given the same importance as a debt related conflict. What it can help with is analysing which districts are affected by a very high rate of conflict – from which, using other data and analysis, strategies can then be developed to mitigate, address and reduce conflict.

## Primary sources

### CPAU monitoring

The key primary resource is a data-set of the monitoring carried out by CPAU Peace Councils in 6 of the 8 target districts. Once the data was cleaned and re-coded the data for 5 districts was significant and include 256 unique conflict incidents in 5 of 8 districts. One district, Chak, had only 8 incidents so was dropped from the quantitative analysis. However it was retained in the analysis as a null category, along with Sayedabad and Jaghori which had no monitoring data collected, to identify whether the CPAU monitoring made a significant difference to our understanding of conflict in the district.

The remaining districts provide information over the period 2005-2008 (first half). Not all districts had data for all years – and Baharak had a gap in reporting for one year between August 2006 – June 2007, though this did not affect the trends noted in the analysis. The analysis of Chak, Sayedabad and Jaghori districts continued without the quantitative data, in effect creating a null category where a conflict analysis is done with qualitative data only. This is important in demonstrating the value added by using quantitative data in support of qualitative analysis.

The data for Kunduz consists of 51 conflicts which were addressed by the Peace Councils in Farza and Kalakan. Seventeen conflicts were recorded in Farza between April 2005 and October 2007. Thirty-four conflicts were recorded in Kalakan between October 2007 and May 2008. The data is a comprehensive set of what the Peace Councils experienced but from interviews with Peace Council members and reviewing the data it is clear that a) the councils are not reporting all of the incidents they deal with b) they are not reporting many incidents they fail to 'resolve'. These issues are discussed in greater depth in Implications for Peace Building Programming later in this synthesis paper.

### Questionnaires

A questionnaire was sent to CPAU staff to assist with political, social and economic understanding of each district under investigation. The questionnaire covered a number of areas including the political affiliations of key individuals in the district and province; movements of nomadic groups; presence of armed groups and functioning of state institutions. The questionnaires were also designed to fill gaps in knowledge about the



relationships between district level conflicts and provincial level conflicts and / or dynamics. For some districts where information was difficult to verify additional organisations and individuals were contacted to provide further analysis.

## Secondary sources

Each of the researchers reviewed literature specific to their region, province and district to investigate the historical conflict trends in that area. This included a range of academic and policy related information and was summarised in a background paper for each district (Provinces where two districts were under investigation were combined into 1 paper). Further the team was able to access a media database covering 2002-2008 for all of the target districts. This allowed the staff to corroborate academic material, the security databases and the CPAU monitoring against reporting from that area.

## Security databases

The team has access to 2 security datasets which are not public. They cover 2002-5 for all provinces/districts and 2007-8 for some of the districts. The two datasets are not comparable.

They provide a benchmark to investigate the statistical linkages between local conflicts (as reported by the CPAU Peace Councils) and higher order conflicts – though simple inferences should not be made and causality can only be made from further qualitative data.

## Analytical frameworks

In order to assist in the ordering, prioritisation and critique of the large amount of data generated by the project various frameworks were developed in the process of the project. Of these two were selected to help provide an appreciation of the dynamics of conflict and another for the dimensions of conflict.

The framework for dimensions of conflict was developed to represent the international/regional, national, provincial and local dynamics and factors in conflicts that had emerged out of the various data sources. The types of conflicts, such as land or water, were inserted into the matrix and the team was asked to identify the links that the major conflicts in their areas had with other actors.

The dynamics of conflict framework is adapted from the Department for International Development's (DfID) Conflict assessment tool developed by the Conflict Security and Development Group (Goodhand 2001). The dynamics framework uses the same list of major conflicts that were in the dimensions framework and asks questions about the relation of the conflict to economic, social, political, and security elements. It has been modified in this project to include space for discussing the policy implications of each section where relations are identified and is presented only in the synthesis paper.

### 3. Conflict history in Kabul

Kabul province is situated in central Afghanistan and comprises 15 districts as well as the provincial and national capital, Kabul city (since 1776).<sup>1</sup> Kabul city is home to nearly 80% of the provincial population of between two and a half and three and a half million people (MRRD Undated; NPS n.d.). The province is dominated by the Kabul river valley, which is surrounded by mountain ranges. As the provincial and national capital, Kabul city contains the headquarters of government, military, international and non-governmental organisations, and while significant employment is provided by the government, local enterprise is growing with extensive markets and small businesses.

Kabul city is ethnically varied, with large populations of all major ethnic groups in Afghanistan. The broader province however is dominated by Pashtun and Tajik groups. Kabul province's population, excluding Kabul city, is around 500,000 people, with the majority (some 70% speaking Pashto has their first language, and 30% speaking Dari).<sup>2</sup> The majority of the Dari speakers live in the Shomali plain, and politically have been more closely aligned with Jamiat-i Islami. The Shomali plain itself is however mixed ethnically and politically.

The Shomali plain, located north of Kabul has a high number of districts with generally small populations (as opposed to the districts to the south which have larger populations), except for Qara Bagh, which has a population of around 50,000 people (CSO and UNFPA 2004). Economically the province is varied, with a range of agricultural and light industrial production. Physical infrastructure in the province is relatively good by Afghan standards – but the infrastructure away from the main highways is still rudimentary (CSO and UNFPA 2004).

	Population <sup>3</sup>	Area (km <sup>2</sup> ) <sup>4</sup>	Major Ethnicities and Tribal Groups <sup>5</sup>	Major Political Parties <sup>6</sup>	Major Agricultural Products <sup>7</sup>
<b>Kabul</b>	2,425,067	4498	Tajik, Pashtun, Hazara, Uzbek, Baluchi, Turkmen, Hindus	Hizb-i Islami, Hizb-i Afghanistan Naween, Hamnazar, Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin, Ittihad-i Islami, Hizb Wahdat, PDPA	Fruit, Wheat, Cereals.
<b>Farza</b>	15,139	54.47	Tajik; Pashtun. Admankhel, Ahmadzai, Chulizai, Omerkhel, Tajikan, Saidan.	Jamiat-i Islami, Nejat Meli.	Fruit, Wheat.
<b>Kalakan</b>	18,192	40.71	Tajik, Pashtun. Mushwany, Nasir, Ahmadzai, Sayeds, Khawjas, Gulistan.	Jamiat-i Islami, Hizb-i Islami; Sazman-i Azadeekhaw.	Fruit, Wheat.

<sup>1</sup> Kabul province was formerly 14 districts, but in the 398 district model Farza district has been created (out of Guldara) Information held by author. Kabul city is also split in to a number of *nahiyya* (or city municipalities) these are not addressed in this study.

<sup>2</sup> Whilst the population is split 70/30, most villages use both languages and ethnicity cannot always be directly inferred from the language spoken.

<sup>3</sup> CSO and UNFPA 2004

<sup>4</sup> Taken from the 398 district model for Afghanistan held by author.

<sup>5</sup> MRRD Undated; NPS n.d.

<sup>6</sup> Various sources

<sup>7</sup> MRRD Undated

## Pre-1978

Kabul, being the capital and seat of power for governments in Afghanistan has been the site of frequent contests. Kabul's politics are intrinsically linked to those of the country as a whole, and therefore the Shomali plain has not always been a significant player in the national politics, except for the brief reign of Bacha-i Saqao (in Dari meaning Son of a Water Carrier) who was originally from Kalakan. In 1929 Bacha-i Saqao led a revolt against King Amanullah and took Kabul early that year and crowned himself Habibullah Ghazi. His reign only lasted until the autumn of that year, when Nadir Khan re-took Kabul from Habibullah's forces. Interestingly for national dynamics in recent history, Habibiullah's brief reign was the first by a Tajik leader.

The 1930s saw the emergence of Pashtun intellectuals demanding greater rights, particularly promoting the Pashto language. Politics had previously been reserved for members of the aristocracy, but following a slow process of reforms under King Amanullah, beginning in 1911, the Young Afghan Movement published manifestos, founded political parties and in the 1940s members were elected to parliament.

The creation and increasing influence of political parties over the 20<sup>th</sup> Century led to repression by the monarchy, and a cycle of reform followed by constriction continued until Zahir Shah, commissioned a new Afghan Constitution in 1964. In July 1973 Daoud overthrew the monarchy and established a republic with himself being the first President of Afghanistan.

## 1979 – 2001

After a bloody coup in 1978 soviet backed People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan PDPA came into power. The Soviets invaded in December 1979 support the government of the PDPA against growing resistance, which by that time was under severe pressure from a broad front of nationalist, royalist and Islamist groups, as well as independent local uprisings unhappy at the sweeping communist reforms (including ambitious land reforms and changes to women's rights). The impact of the conflict on Kabul city and the Shomali plain were quite different.

Fighting was not a frequent part of Kabul city life in the 1980's which enjoyed relative security. A large proportion of conscripts in to the under-resourced DRA army came from Kabul city. As would become a recurrent theme in conflict over the next 30 years, control of the main highway and the lure of operations in Kabul produced significant destabilisation of the broader area – despite it being designated part of 'strategic Afghanistan'; by the Soviets (Rubin 2002).

Kabul province was home to a range of resistance groups and was politically fragmented, including Abdul Haq, Hizb-i Islami (Khalis) commander, who had extensive networks in an around Kabul city (Rubin 2002, 217). The Shomali plain was also politically fragmented and was crisscrossed with checkpoints, military convoys and resistance groups vying for control of the key northern highway (Dorronsoro 2005, 247).

In the Afghan year 1371 (April 1992 – March 1993), Kabul was the scene of almost constant fighting as the Najibullah regime was overthrown by various mujahedin factions who fought to fill the vacuum. President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who nominally ruled the country from 1992-1996, was part of the leadership of Jamiat-i Islami together with Ahmed Shah Massoud who had control of the Shomali plain for much of this period. Kabul increasingly began to be seen as the major prize in the conflict, and through its control various factions believed they would be able to secure their position in a political settlement (Dorronsoro 2007). Between 1992 and September 1996 half a million people fled the city, and up to 25,000 were killed (Dorronsoro 2007). The period was characterised by appalling and systematic violations of international humanitarian law committed by both sides, including indiscriminate aerial bombardment, shelling and summary executions (HRW 2005).

Following the rise of the Taliban in southern Afghanistan from 1994 Kabul was captured by the Taliban in 1996. For much of the next 4 years the Shomali plain was part of the frontline between the Taliban and Jamiat forces

which resulted in a scorched earth policy by the Taliban largely clearing the area of most of the population (Dorransoro 2005). In 1999 the Taliban ordered civilians living in parts of the Shomali to leave (UNHCR 2002).

## 2001 – Present

In the aftermath of the attacks on the United States on September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 the Northern Alliance, at that time consisting of Hizb-i Wahdat, Junbesh and Shura-i Nazar, were given materiel and air superiority through Operation Enduring Freedom to defeat Taliban forces. The Shura-i Nazar forces led by Gen Bismillah Khan and Gen Fahim captured Kabul in November 2001 (Stewart 2002).

The takeover of Kabul by Shura-i Nazar forces, which had increasingly become identified as a Tajik force, was welcomed in many, though not all, parts of the Shomali and led to rapid and large scale resettlement of the area. Over the next 7 years conflict and insecurity was dominated by the dynamic where Kabul city (and outlying military targets) acted as symbolic targets, whilst the outlying areas to the North have remained relatively peaceful. However increasing instability in the area has been linked to both an increase in criminality (in some measure linked to drugs smuggling) and the encroaching insurgency.

## Political Parties and actors<sup>8</sup>

Political parties in Kabul province have been characterised by a split between those south of the capital (including Paghman, Surobi, Musayi, Char Dehi and so on) and those in the Shomali plain (including both Farza and Kalakan). Those to the south have generally been aligned to a number of parties which increasingly became associated with Pashtun parties, whilst those in the north a broader support for parties that became associated with those of Tajik ethnicity, along with some representation of Pashtun parties.

Given the fact that Shura-i Nazar forces were able to take control of Kabul in November 2001 they were also able to dictate some of the terms of government and secure a number of powerful positions in the new government (Dorransoro 2005, 333). The long standing differences between Rabbani's Jamiat-i Islami and the military elements of Shura-i Nazar (now partly reformed under Qanooni as Hizb-i Afghanistan-i Nawaen) continued (ICG 2003), until 2005 when they proposed a new coalition. Whilst there are connections between the groups under Nihzat-i Milli by late 2006 they were operating separately again (Ruttig 2006, 21).

Hizb-i Islami Khalis (HiK), which had been active around southern Kabul, has mostly ceased to operate after it split along pro and anti-government factions, and the death of Younis Khalis in July 2006. The anti-government faction, led by Khalis' son Anwar-ul Haq Mujahid declared Jihad as early as 2003, but has not been a major player. From its powerbase in Nangarhar most members moved over to the government camp, and their leader Hajji Din Mohammed became Kabul's governor in June 2005 (Ruttig 2006, 22). Kabul's Deputy Governor is Sheikh Abdullah Mohsein an ethnic Pashtun appointed in May 2004 (NPS n.d.b).

Another Pashtun party that has had strong links to southern Kabul is Ittihad-i Islami, led by Sayaf. He was one of the original leaders of the Islamic resistance against the Soviets, went on to resist the Taliban and was subsequently appointed by Karzai to the Constitutional Loya Jirga. Sayaf stood in the 2005 Parliamentary elections and won a seat in the Wolesi Jirga after securing significant votes in Paghman in 2005. He is currently the head of the Foreign Relations Committee. Ittihad was reformed as Tanzim-i Dawat-i Islami-i Afghanistan with Sayaf still as its leader (Ruttig 2006).

The Kabul provincial Chief of Police has changed hands many times since 2002. After extensive anti-US rioting in Kabul, Amanullah Guzar was appointed Chief of Police in June 2006, replacing Jamil Junbish as part of a reshuffle that saw police chiefs in 26 provinces removed. The controversial appointment of Guzar was condemned by Human Rights groups who believe he is linked to land theft and extortion in his home district

---

<sup>8</sup> Given that the capital city attracts the activities of a very broad range of political parties this section focuses primarily on the parties which have support in rural Kabul, which may also be reflected in Kabul city.

on the Shomali plain (Walsh 2006). Gubar was replaced by Major General Esmatullah Daulatzai in January 2007 under the police department reforms programme, a process that included the removal of 16 provincial police chiefs (Ibrahimi 2007). Daulatzai was superseded by General Muhammad Salem Ihsas in September 2007. The current incumbent is Abdur Rahman Rahman who replaced Ayub Salangi, who earlier took the place of Ihsas following the attempted assassination of President Karzai in April 2008 (Quqnoos 2008). Rahman, who was appointed in January 2009, is an ethnic Pashtun and has no known affiliation with any armed groups.

**Table 1 Summary of key Government and Taliban actors in Kabul province**

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Known Current Affiliation</b>	<b>Known Previous Affiliation</b>	<b>Any known relations between officials</b>
<b>Governor</b>	Hajji Din Mohammad	Hizb-i Islami (Khalis faction)		
<b>Police Chief</b>	General Abdur Rahman Rahman			

#### 4. Shomali plain

From 1996 until 2001, the Shomali plain was a site of almost continual fighting. The Taliban persisted in “scorched-earth” tactics in combination with their military operations. These tactics included razing homes, mining irrigation systems and uprooting vineyards and orchards. The United Front forces also committed abuses, targeting especially ethnic Pashtuns thought to be Taliban sympathisers. Because of these abuses, many inhabitants fled, either north to the Panjshir valley or south to the slums of Kabul, often leaving no-one in the villages (Biswas 2005). During this time the districts of Farza and Kalakan changed hands repeatedly, Massoud's forces attacking from their base in the Panjshir valley, and Taliban forces fighting their way north from Kabul. Across the Shomali plain, men believed to be loyal to Massoud were arrested or shot, and women and children were taken by truck to Pakistan or made to walk to Kabul. Some one thousand ethnic Tajik men were reportedly separated from their families during the exodus and held by the Taliban. Over four days in August 1998 the UN estimated that over twenty thousand people fled to Kabul, bringing the total to close to forty thousand in a two-week period (HRW 2000).

In July 1999 a Taliban offensive in the Shomali plains was marked by summary executions, the abduction and disappearance of women, the burning of homes, and the destruction of other property and agricultural assets, including the cutting down of fruit trees. According to a report by the UN Secretary-General dated November 16, 1999, “The Taliban forces, who allegedly carried out these acts, essentially treated the civilian population with hostility and made no distinction between combatants and non-combatants.” (HRW 2000) This phase of the fighting left the area with virtually no population and with all basic infrastructure destroyed including all schools, healthcare facilities and economic opportunities (e.g. markets).

Since the US coalition invasion in 2001 and the retaking of Kabul by Northern Alliance forces, refugees who fled the districts have slowly returned from abroad (Iran and Pakistan), from the Panjshir valley to the north, and from Kabul itself. Land disputes are common, although it appears that, since virtually all inhabitants were forced to leave, there is little disagreement over who has ownership of houses (i.e. levels of appropriation seem lower than for example Kunduz) and the land on which they were built. Disputes over land seem to be mostly related to roads, property boundaries and the use of land for grazing and agriculture.

## 5. Farza

To the north of the capital the paved Salang road links Kabul to the Northern provinces. The districts of Farza and Kalakan are situated about 30 minutes drive from Kabul, towards Parwan province. The land is mostly flat, rising to foothills of between 2000 and 2500 metres. Farza sits in the hills of the north-western part of Shomali plain with a population of around 15,000, spread between about 18 villages.

Water is in plentiful supply as it drains from the mountains to the west, and traditional irrigation methods (Karez and canals) have enabled substantial agricultural activities, limited only by the available land (as the district is on a hillside). In January 1991 Farza was separated as an independent district from Mir Bacha Kot but this structure was not recognised by the Taliban (UNHCR 2002). Farza was finally recognised in 2005 and was split out of Guldara. Farza is predominantly Tajik with some Pashtun minorities. During the war, and particularly after 1996, fighting virtually destroyed the entire district, forcing the population from their homes and land.

The main party in Farza is Jamiat-i Islami but there are also supporters of Jebh-i Nejat-i Milli, a moderate secular party of national liberation (Grau 2004) with no significant support outside the district. Nejat was a minor player in the Northern Alliance structure established in 1997 and is led by Sibghatullah Mujaddedi (Ruttig 2006, 15). There are no offices of political parties in Farza. There are a number of different parties in the district, but their political affiliation tends to be divided by ethnicity, with Pashtun groups supporting Hizb-i Islami while Tajiks support Jamiat-i Islami (CPAU field data 2008).

Erfanullah Erfan, a Wolesi Jirga member from Farza, has no affiliation to a particular party (CPAU field data 2008), but is a conservative and member of the Committee on the Fight against Drugs and Moral Corruption. In this capacity he has supported moves to ban public dancing, the consumption of alcohol, and Indian soap operas from being broadcast on private TV networks, which he criticised as “foreign to the Afghan mentality and culture” (RFE 2008)

Farza’s district governor is Khaja Rahmatullah Faqirzada. He is a member of Jamiat-i Islami; is an ethnic Tajik from Shakardara, and has been governor for since 2008. The Farza district Chief of Police is Asadullah Natawan, a Pashtun from Chahar Bolak, Balkh; and has been in the post for two years. Neither has any recognised connection to armed groups.

**Table 2 Significant actors in Farza**

	Name	Known Current Affiliation	Known Previous Affiliation	Any known relations between officials
<b>Governor</b>	Khaja Rahmatullah Faqirzada	Jamiat-i Islami		
<b>Police Chief</b>	Asadullah Natawan			
<b>MP</b>	Erfanullah Erfan			

## 6. Kalakan

Kalakan resides on the Shomali plain, mostly to the east of the main road. The area was almost completely destroyed by the war, and the population almost entirely displaced, so although people have now returned, they have had to re-build shelter and irrigation systems. Kalakan is situated on fertile land, and the area is historically abundant with fruit orchards, cherries, vines, mulberries, grapes, plums, apples, willow and wheat. However, drought has severely affected the area over the last few years, which was exacerbated by the wholesale destruction of the Karez irrigation systems during the conflict. Opium is not grown, although local control of the main road for the trafficking of opium to Northern provinces and Tajikistan is a potential source

of conflict. The population is ethnically split between Pashtun and Tajik, but many mixed families and joint efforts towards rehabilitation mean that ethnic divisions are not a significant source of conflict.

Whilst there are no party offices the most significant party in Kalakan is Jamiat-i Islami. In Kalakan Hizb-i Islami and Sazman-i Azadeekhaw also enjoy support. There are no political party offices in the district. While there are several different tribes living in Kalakan, they are largely divided by ethnicity, with Pashtun tribes supporting Hizb-i Islami while Tajiks support Jamiat-i Islami and Sazman-i Azadeekhaw.

Hajji Mohammad Dawood Kalakani is a member of the Wolesi Jirga and is an ethnic Tajik from Kalakan. He is associated with the Sayaf political party. He was previously the political chief for the 8<sup>th</sup> Corps, and was injured in a suicide bombing in Baghlan in November 2007 (NPS n.d.b).

The Kalakan district governor is Mahamad Zarif (Rashid), a member of Jamiat-i Islami; is a Tajik from Istalif district. He has been in the post for four years. The district Chief of Police is Commander Ahmad Jawad is also a member of Jamiat-i Islami and is also Tajik from Said Kheel district, Parwan province. He has been Police Chief for two years. Neither has any recognised connection to armed groups (CPAU field data 2008).

**Table 3 Significant actors in Kalakan**

	Name	Known Current Affiliation	Known Previous Affiliation	Any known relations between officials
<b>Governor</b>	Mahamad Zarif (Rashid)	Jamiat-i Islami		
<b>Police Chief</b>	Commander Ahmad Jawad	Jamiat-i Islami		

## 7. Conflict Dynamics

### Local Level Conflict Resolution

District-level data on conflict in Farza and Kalakan is based on CPAU data on the number of conflicts, including the type and parties to conflicts, recorded by the CPAU Peace Councils in the district. The combined population of Farza and Kalakan is over 33,000 people (CSO and UNFPA 2004). In Farza and Kalakan the data under analysis was provided by 13 Peace Councils,<sup>9</sup> which reported 51 conflicts that were brought to their offices in the period from April 2005 to October 2007 (in Farza) and between October 2007 – May 2008 (in Kalakan). Based on the records of the Peace Councils in Farza and Kalakan, as well as extensive open-source research and interviews, conflict trends and links between district, province and national-level conflicts will be examined.<sup>10</sup>

Looking overall at the pattern of local conflict over the period local conflict seems to be rather flat in 2005 – 2007, with a sharp increase in to 2008 (see Figure 1). This coincides with the move of the project in Kalakan on the invitation of the local elders. The Peace Councils that were established were thrown in to a situation of extremely prevalent conflict – at a level which was much more intense than that in Farza. This may be in part

<sup>9</sup> There were 7 councils in Farza and 6 in Kalakan. A seventh council (comprised entirely of women) was established in Kalakan in mid-2008 after the data was collected.

<sup>10</sup> In the sample districts Farza and Kalakan are the only districts to be assessed together. Methodologically this varies from other papers in this series where districts are assessed separately. It however provides some insights in to the functioning of the Peace Councils and their impacts on local conflict that would not otherwise be apparent. The timeframe of the conflicts recorded do not overlap, but provide a continuous record from October 2005 – May 2008.

because local conflicts had been addressed by Peace Councils there over a number of years, leading to a reduction, or possibly containment, in the level of local conflict in Farza.

However whilst local conflict seems to have been contained, it is still relatively intense, especially in comparison with the other districts in the sample. The intensity seems low against the exceptional levels recorded in Kalakan in 2008, but is still high. Interestingly land conflicts are not always the most intense in Farza, with 2006 registering more Marriage, divorce and domestic violence conflicts. This may be as a result of the more stable political relationships which reduce the level of land and water related conflicts. There are very low levels of 'Other' conflicts (which relate to a few interpersonal disputes) and only one Murder / Blood feud – which resulted in the only local conflict which turned violent in these districts. There are no Debt / Financial conflicts.

Conflicts within Farza tended to be split between inter-family and intra-community conflict, with a similar but lower level of intra-family conflict (see Figure 2). There were almost no inter-communal conflicts indicating little communal conflict, again possibly reflecting the more stable political arrangements in the district.<sup>11</sup> However when the Peace Councils started operating in Kalakan there were significant increases in communal conflicts, which eclipsed familial conflicts accounting for nearly two-thirds of conflicts in the first five months of 2008.




Figure 1 Causes of conflict in Farza & Kalakan – CPAU monitoring

Two inferences can be made here, firstly, as it was the elders who asked for the Peace Councils to be established in Kalakan it can be surmised there was already a high level of conflict, particularly communal, which was of concern to local leaders. Secondly, the introduction of the councils may not have decreased conflict in the short-term, and may lead to an increase of conflict (or at least its recording) as communities begin to address them.

<sup>11</sup> Both of the conflicts in the inter-communal category occurred in 2007, involved road or car parking facilities and were referred to the Peace Council by district officials.






Figure 2 Parties involved in conflicts in Farza & Kalakan – CPAU monitoring

### Seasonality

Aggregating all the conflicts across the year there is a clear pattern of land and water conflicts increasing in March and May (see Figure 3). This is in-line with high periods of land and water usage at those times of the year. There is an additional spike in December which is unusual as it is not a time of year where land or water use is particularly intensive. This is almost entirely due to a number of conflicts seen by the Farza district Peace Council in December 2005, most of which were disputes regarding the ownership of land or water. It is possible that these disagreements were related or caused by the same event (e.g. the return of previous owners of land), since there were no land or water disputes seen by the Farza Peace Council in the months surrounding December 2005.

The large spike in ‘Other’ conflicts in May is entirely because of conflicts from Kalakan, which were largely because of accidents (such as road accidents etc) rather than long standing enmities. Otherwise there continued to be a low level of Marriage / divorce and domestic violence conflicts at regular points during the year, with a spike in February.




Figure 3 Causes of conflict by month – CPAU monitoring

When looking at the parties to conflicts across the annual cycle it is clear that the spikes in Land and Water conflicts are driven by inter-communal conflicts (primarily from Kalakan), and those related to Marriage, divorce and domestic violence are located within families (see Figure 4). It may be significant that most of the intra-community conflict related to Kalakan was also about Land and Water (accounting for the smaller spikes in March and May) but those in Farza were generally related to ‘Other’ conflicts.




Figure 4 Parties to conflict by month – CPAU monitoring

The graph below suggests that there is a relatively even split within the districts as to the parties to conflict, with a lower rate of intra-family conflict (see Figure 5). This however masks the fact that whilst Farza and Kalakan have a relatively similar number of conflicts across the familial and intra-community conflicts, Kalakan provided almost all the conflicts in the inter-community column. Given the way that the Peace Councils were invited to work in Kalakan, and the high intensity of conflict noted already in Kalakan, it is clear that there are real differences between the ways the two districts experience conflict, and are able to address it.




Figure 5 Total parties to conflict – CPAU monitoring

## Other Actors and Conflict

### Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG)

The DDR programme focused intensely on Kalakan which was subject to two disarmament programmes, from where Amanullah Guzar of the 8<sup>th</sup> Division was from. The DDR programme listed the force strength of Div 8 at 400 men (ANBP 2004), but at the same time it was believed that around 1,200 of his men transferred from the AMF in to the Afghan National Police prior to demobilisation where Guzar was a commander in the highway police (ICG 2005; Dennys 2005).

The second disarmament programme was run by the Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention (JCCP) through which a smaller number of combatants were given training in carpentry and other skills.<sup>12</sup>

Guzar was appointed Police chief of Kabul in 2006, despite concerns from international observers about Guzar's potential links to land grabs (Walsh 2006). There were concerns at the time that it was hard to distinguish between Guzar's influence in Kalakan and the local shura structures (Dennys 2005) – which may have exacerbated some of the conflict dynamics leading to the very high conflict rates seen by the Peace Councils when they started operating in 2007.

There were no known AMF forces stationed in Farza but there are believed to be illegally armed groups. While Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programmes focussed on disarming members of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF), it was recognised that more had to be done to disarm illegal armed groups (IAGs). The worsening security situation prevented extensive implementation of the programme, and the number of districts targeted was reduced to a more manageable level, focussing on those districts where disarmament could be more effectively achieved. Farza was one of the districts that was subsequently targeted, and was rated as one of the more successful areas by UNDP and the Afghan New Beginnings Project (ANBP), with 98% achievement. Six IAGs were engaged in the district and 46 weapons were collected (UNDP 2008).

Whilst the IAGs in Farza are believed to have been addressed, this didn't seem to have an impact on local conflict, which as noted above remained relatively constant from 2005-7. It is not known whether there were IAGs operating in Kalakan.

### National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and Community Development Councils (CDCs)

The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) was created in 2003 by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development to “develop the ability of Afghan communities to identify, plan, manage and monitor their own development projects” (NSP 2008) The NSP has implemented projects in 14 Kabul districts (all the non-municipality districts) in 543 villages with 1306 projects with a value of \$19.2m. In Farza 19 projects have been implemented, whilst in Kalakan there were 44 projects (MRRD 2008).

The projects in Farza focused largely on road construction and the boring of shallow wells. Neither of these issues were cited as causes of local conflict, and it seems that the projects were implemented in a largely conflict sensitive manner. Similarly in Kalakan the NSP projects focused on road construction (or culverts) and shallow wells, in addition to some vocational training projects. Whilst there are a number of conflicts recorded about conflicts regarding walls, roads and sharing of water resources, there is nothing to suggest it was the NSP's projects that caused them.

---

<sup>12</sup> CPAU was involved in providing Peace education to 32 ex-combatants during this project (CPAU 2007).

## Returnees

In Kalakan approximately 46.5% of the population have returned, in Farza 0.1%<sup>13</sup> of the population have returned (this could be higher as it is a new district and some returns were coded as Guldara, however returns there totalled only 2,430 individuals, so if half of them did go to Farza the percentage of returns would be 9.3%). Overall in the Shomali 200,215 people returned, of an estimated population in 2003 of 251,863 meaning 79.5% of the population returned (CSO and UNFPA 2004; UNHCR 2008). This is exceptionally high, but the depopulation of the area by the Taliban was quite extensive.

Returns seem to have been high in 2002, and have generally declined over the next 5 years, with a small increase again in 2008. As a side note whilst nomadic groups do not use the area for grazing they do pass through the Shomali, and in 1999 were ordered by the Taliban to cut down all the trees in Farza (UNHCR 2002), as far as can be ascertained there is no ongoing conflict between the nomadic and settled populations in the two districts.

**Table 4 Assisted returns of Farza, Kalakan, the Shomali plain and Kabul province (% of annual returns to Shomali) (UNHCR 2008)**

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
<b>Farza</b>	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	8 (0.01%)	0 (0%)	35 (0.9%)	153 (2.5%)	196 (0.1%)
<b>Kalakan</b>	5,144 (4.0%)	601 (2.8%)	953 (3.7%)	732 (8.0%)	223 (5.8%)	254 (6.6%)	552 (9.0%)	8,459 (4.2%)
<b>Shomali plain</b>	129,549	21,830	25,900	9,159	3,848	3,822	6,107	200,215
<b>Kabul Province</b>	658,849	123,948	198,678	79,776	31,751	28,791	33,329	1,155,122

## Drugs

There is no poppy cultivation in Farza or Kalakan districts (UNODC 2008). The only poppy cultivation in the whole of Kabul province is in the district of Surobi, and although it has increased in recent years, the amount is negligible in comparison to the large growing areas in other provinces. Afghanistan's ring road goes through Kalakan to the north, and so provides a route for drugs to exit the country. The highway north along the Shomali is believed to be a key smuggling route for drugs, however it is unclear whether the districts which the road pass through have a stake in the traffic.

Farza has seen a decrease in addicts and no drug-related crime, in Kalakan drugs problems are limited to small scale robbery committed by addicts to fund their habit. Although still a small minority, addicts in this district are mostly returning refugees from Iran and Pakistan (CPAU field data 2008).

## Demining

Demining efforts have been led by the Halo Trust, the United Nations Mine Action Center and Roots of Peace, operating in both districts. The operation ran from 2002-2006 and cleared agricultural land ready for planting (Roots of Peace 2007). Most areas of Farza are now safe, except for areas of hillside not used for farming. In Kalakan district mines and unexploded ordinance (UXO) were a problem in several villages, and continued to be so as refugees and IDPs returned to reclaim their land.

## Links between local conflict and higher level conflict

In trying to contextualise the levels of conflict noted by the Peace Councils security incident data has been divided by a range of causes, for both Kabul province (including Kabul city see Figure 6) and for the Shomali

<sup>13</sup> This is clearly too low as 49 families (i.e. at least 250 people) were known to have returned by May 2002 Furthermore in 1999 the Taliban ordered all the villagers to leave the area (at the time totalling 4,500 – 5,000 *families*) (UNHCR 2002).

plain (see Figure 7). Whilst there is a clear trend towards increasing severity of conflict, given the large population numbers the severity is significantly lower than those seen in Farza and Kalakan. Of note however is the increase in criminality, below the overall increase of resistance to government cases, this is particularly marked in the Shomali plain where it reaches parity with conflicts associated with resistance to government in 2006.

Neither figure can lead to conclusions that in the Shomali there are significant links between higher order conflict and local conflict. That is not to say they will not be linked in the future, it seems that the displacement by Kabul city is so strong, and the political environment relatively cohesive that significant destabilising conflict which then impacts on local level conflict is largely absent.




Figure 6 Causes of conflict Security Database 1 (Kabul province)




Figure 7 Causes of conflict Security Database 1 (Shomali Plain including Farza, Kalakan, Guldara, Qara Bagh, Deh Sabz, Mir Bacha Kot, Istalif and Shakardara)

## 8. Dimensions of Conflict

Through this study it is clear that there are numerous interlinking factors that lead to and impact on conflict trends. Local or district-level conflicts that have been discussed on the basis of CPAU Peace Council data can be understood as linked to causes at provincial, national, and even regional levels. Effectively pursuing an agenda of local-level conflict resolution thus requires an examination and understanding of the often complex higher level conflicts and factors of influence. The table below aims to consolidate and present some of the numerous possible causal links between local conflict and contributing higher level factors, which are outlined as they apply to the categories of 'Regional', 'National' and 'Provincial'.

Table 5 Conflict dimensions - Farza and Kalakan<sup>14</sup>

Local Conflict Name	Regional	National	Provincial
<b>1. Land and water conflicts – Type 1 - localised livelihoods</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>2. Land conflict – Type 2 – Land acquisition</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>3. Land conflict – Type 3 – migration of nomadic groups</b>	N/A	N/A	Historically (1990's) there was some conflict involving nomadic groups, though this seems not to have re-emerged.
<b>4. Activity of government opposition groups</b>	Armed groups may be supported by foreign funds and equipment. Ideological and technical support offered to al-Qaeda sympathisers.	Attacks on government targets and international organisations are loosely part of national campaign by Taliban, al-Qaeda and other anti-government elements	Various sources of anti-government violence, including local warlords (acting against those in government positions) & Taliban. Historical conflicts continue to breed distrust, although reconciliation between those who returned to the districts has occurred.
<b>5. Inter-party or factional conflicts</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>6. Criminal activities</b>		There seem to be linkages between provincial smuggling groups and those outside the province	Drugs smuggling and the control of the highway north of Kabul can be a source of tension.
<b>7. Debt and financial conflicts</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A

<sup>14</sup> The design of this table was inspired by (Autesserre 2006) who argued that in addressing conflicts in Eastern Congo the national and regional conflicts and their linkages to and expression in local conflict must be understood. The table here adds another dimension, the Province, which is critical to the state apparatus in Afghanistan.

<b>8. Marriage and domestic violence</b>		Engagement disputes can cause larger public conflicts and feuds; family disputes over land	Wedding costs and <i>Toyana</i> generate economic hardship and debt  Gender relations and inheritance customs perpetuate inequities
------------------------------------------	--	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The most commonly occurring conflicts at the district level are disputes over access to land and water. However whilst in Farza there seems to be a fairly constant level of conflict, Kalakan was seriously affected by land and water related conflicts in 2008, associated with the establishment of the Peace Councils. Whilst some of those are traditional livelihoods conflicts, there does seem to be a background to the high level of land conflicts in the presence of armed groups related to factions who may have been involved in land grabs.

Interestingly the high levels of conflict noted in both districts seem insulated from the wider deterioration in security in Kabul and the Shomali plain. This is in part because the districts are relatively unimportant in comparison with Kabul city and the concentration of international armed forces, government targets and the desire for armed groups to carry out spectacular attacks seems to be sparing these districts from the affects of the insurgency.

## 9. Conclusion

Local conflict in the Shomali plain is pervasive and quite intense. Locally, the most significant sources of conflict are disputes over land and water, followed by disputes over marriages. While these conflicts can escalate they are generally not violent suggesting that the Peace Councils are dealing with low-level and non-fatal conflicts.

The Peace Councils appear to be an effective method of dealing with local conflict in Farza and Kalakan. Although it is difficult to estimate what proportion of the conflicts dealt with by the Peace Councils would not be resolved, the anecdotal evidence is quite strong, with several groups in the districts indicating that they see the Peace Councils as a viable way of bringing greater harmony and reducing *violent* conflict. It also seems that, with Kalakan the exceptional intensity of the conflicts may be as a result of the Peace Councils dealing with a backlog of conflict issues. It would be important to re-evaluate the level of conflict in Kalakan in 2009 to see whether the levels of conflict have begun to reduce or not. The seasonal nature of the conflicts (with more conflicts in the spring) suggests that conflict resolution resources, if in short supply, should be targeted at the more violent times of the year.

On the provincial level, as with the national picture, the most serious types of violent incident are attacks on government or international targets. Not only are these symbolic in damaging the government or international community, they serve as effective warnings to local people involved in work with the state.

Whilst there are links exist between conflict at the district level and those at the national and regional levels, it is difficult in these districts to see how they feed in to each other, and here at least the linkages appear latent rather than active. This may be in part because Kabul is such a focus of higher level conflicts that the Kabul hinterland is overlooked. Therefore while there are increasing anti-government attacks in the province as a whole, the data shows that that the districts north of Kabul are largely devoid of such violence, and although links can be made between regional groups and violent actors in Afghanistan, these national actors mostly attack symbolic targets in the capital city.

## Bibliography

- ACTED. "ACTED AFG." *ReliefWeb*. Jul 1, 2004.  
[http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps\\_Sa.nsf/luFullMap/BE1B370563E6673D85256EDE006E04D6/\\$File/acted\\_afg270704.pdf?OpenElement](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps_Sa.nsf/luFullMap/BE1B370563E6673D85256EDE006E04D6/$File/acted_afg270704.pdf?OpenElement) (accessed Dec 23, 2008).
- ANBP. *DDR Status Report (as at 29 June 04)*. Internal document held by author, Kabul: ANBP, 2004.
- Arnoldy, Ben. "Afghans see forests, tree by tree." *CSMonitor*. Aug 1, 2005.  
<http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0801/p11s02-wosc.html> (accessed Dec 23, 2008).
- Autesserre, S. "Local Violence, National Peace? Postwar "Settlement" in the Eastern D.R. Congo (2003–2006) ." *African Studies Review*, 2006: Volume 49, Number 3, pp. 1–29.
- Beall, Jo, and Daniel Esser. *Shaping Urban Futures: Challenges to Governing and Managing Afghan Cities*. Kabul: AREU, 2005.
- Biswas, Soutik. "Afghan village mirrors national plight." *BBC news*. Sep 13, 2005.  
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/4244454.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4244454.stm) (accessed Dec 19, 2008).
- CPAU. "CPAU Overview." *CPAU*. Jan 2007.  
[http://www.cpau.org.af/about\\_us/Docs\\_our\\_purpose/CPAU\\_Overview.doc](http://www.cpau.org.af/about_us/Docs_our_purpose/CPAU_Overview.doc) (accessed Dec 30, 2008).
- CPAU field data. "Thematic Questionnaire." Jul 12, 2008.
- CSO and UNFPA. *A socio-economic profile and demographic profile: a household listing*. Kabul: Central Statistics Office, 2004.
- CSO and UNFPA. *Ghazni: A Socio-economic and Demographic Profile, Household Listing*. Kabul: Central Statistics Office, 2003.
- DeGrasse, Beth, and Emily Hsu. "Afghanistan: Old Problems, New Parliament, New Expectations." *United States Institute of Peace (USIP)*. Oct 2005.  
[http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace\\_briefings/2005/1025\\_afghanwomen.html](http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2005/1025_afghanwomen.html) (accessed Dec 19, 2008).
- Dennys, Christian. *Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament? The effects of disarmament in Afghanistan*. Tokyo: JVC, 2005.
- Dorronsoro, Gilles. *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present*. The CERI Series in Comparative Politics & International Studies, 2005.
- Goodhand, Jonathan. *Conflict assessments A synthesis report: Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Nepal and Sri Lanka* . London: Conflict Security and Development Group, 2001.
- Grau, Lester W. "The Soviet-Afghan War." *Foreign Military Studies Office*. 3 2004.  
<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/miredinmount.htm> (accessed Dec 10, 2008).
- Grono, Nick. "Evidence Afghanistan." *ICG*. Dec 13, 2005.  
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3857&l=1> (accessed Dec 23, 2008).
- HRW. *Afghanistan, Humanity Denied: Systematic Violations of Women's Rights in Afghanistan*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2001.
- . "Asia Overview." *Human Rights Watch*. 2000. <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Asia.htm> (accessed Dec 19, 2008).



—. "Blood-Stained Hands: Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan's Legacy of Impunity." *Human Rights Watch*. Jun 7, 2005. <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/07/06/blood-stained-hands> (accessed Dec 23, 2008).

—. "Fuelling Afghanistan's War, Press Backgrounder." *Human Rights Watch*. 12 2000. <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghanistan/afghbk.htm> (accessed Dec 19, 2008).

—. "Killing you is a very easy thing for us: Human Rights Abuses in Southeast Afghanistan." *Human Rights Watch*. Jul 2003. <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/afghanistan0703/afghanistan0703.pdf> (accessed Dec 19, 2008).

Ibrahimi, Habib Rahman. "New Kabul Police Chief Takes Charge." *Pajhwok Afghan News*. Jan 16, 2007. <http://www.afgha.com/?q=node/1650> (accessed Dec 19, 2008).

ICG. *Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track*. Asia Briefing N°35, Brussels and Kabul: International Crisis Group, 2005.

—. "Conflict History: Afghanistan." *International Crisis Group (ICG)*. Dec 2007. [http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict\\_search&l=1&t=1&c\\_country=1](http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=1) (accessed Dec 23, 2008).

ICG. *Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan*. ICG Asia Report N°65, Brussels and Kabul: International Crisis Group, 2003.

India Times. "CIA points to ISI hand in suicide attack on Indian embassy in Kabul." *India Times*. Jul 30, 2008. [http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/PoliticsNation/CIA\\_points\\_to\\_ISI\\_hand\\_in\\_suicide\\_attack\\_on\\_Indian\\_embassy\\_in\\_Kabul/articleshow/3308449.cms](http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/PoliticsNation/CIA_points_to_ISI_hand_in_suicide_attack_on_Indian_embassy_in_Kabul/articleshow/3308449.cms) (accessed Dec 2008, 19).

IRIN News. "Kuchi Nomads Seek a Better Deal." *IRIN*. Feb 18, 2008. <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=76794> (accessed Dec 23, 2008).

ISAF. "ISAF News Release." *NATO*. Jun 4, 2008. <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2008/06-june/pr080604-227.html> (accessed Dec 19, 2008).

MRRD. "Detail List of Projects From Year 2002 to 2008." *MRRD*. 8 2008. <http://www.mrrd.gov.af/NSP/NSP-Projects.pdf> (accessed 12 2008, 15).

—. "MRRD Kabul provincial profile." *MRRD*. Undated. <http://www.mrrd.gov.af/NABDP/Provincial%20Profiles/Kabul%20PDP%20Provincial%20profile.pdf> (accessed 12 19, 2008).

—. "Press Release." *MRRD*. May 15, 2008. <http://www.mrrd.gov.af/English/Data/PR%20-%2015%20May%202008.pdf> (accessed Dec 23, 2008).

NATO. "ISAF RC & PRT locations." *NATO*. Apr 1, 2008. [http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/graphics/afghanistan\\_prt3.pdf](http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/graphics/afghanistan_prt3.pdf) (accessed Dec 19, 2008).

NPS. "Kabul Executive Summary." *NPS Program for Culture & Conflict Studies*. n.d.b. [http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Executive%20Summaries/Kabul\\_Executive\\_Summary.pdf](http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Executive%20Summaries/Kabul_Executive_Summary.pdf) (accessed Dec 19, 2008).

—. "Kabul Province." *NPS Program for Culture & Conflict Studies*. <http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Kabul.html> (accessed Dec 19, 2008).

NSP. NSP. 2008. <http://www.nspafghanistan.org/> (accessed Dec 23, 2008).

NSP. "NSP Coverage Map." NSP. Mar 2008b. NSP Coverage Map; [http://www.nspafghanistan.org/download/NSP\\_Coverage\\_Mar\\_2008.pdf](http://www.nspafghanistan.org/download/NSP_Coverage_Mar_2008.pdf) (accessed Dec 23, 2008).

Quqnoos. "Kabul's disgraced police chief replaced." *Quqnoos.com*. Jul 6, 2008. [http://quqnoos.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=1071&Itemid=48](http://quqnoos.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1071&Itemid=48) (accessed Dec 19, 2008).

RFE. "Afghanistan: TV stations ordered to stop broadcasting 'un-Islamic' content." *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. Apr 22, 2008. <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/480f1016e.html> (accessed Dec 19, 2008).

Roots of Peace. *Roots of Peace*. Nov 2007. <http://www.rootsofpeace.org/programs/countries/afghanistan/2007/11/mines-to-vines-battlefield-min.html> (accessed Dec 23, 2008).

Rubin, Barnett. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*. Yale University Press, 2002.

Ruttig, Thomas. "Islamists, Leftists – And a Void in the Centre: Afghanistan's Political Parties and where they come from (1902-2006)." *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung*. Nov 27, 2006. [http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\\_9674-544-2-30.pdf](http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_9674-544-2-30.pdf) (accessed Dec 19, 2008).

Stewart, Richard W. *Special Forces in Afghanistan: Oct 01-Mar 02*. [http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/armed\\_dipl/armed\\_2.pdf](http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/armed_dipl/armed_2.pdf), Center of Military History, 2002.

UNDP. "DIAG Annual Report 2007." *UNDP*. Feb 26, 2008. <http://www.undp.org.af/WhoWeAre/UNDPinAfghanistan/Projects/Reports/DIAG/2008-02-26%20-%202007%20Annual%20Report%20-%20ANBP-DIAG.pdf> (accessed Dec 19, 2008).

UNHCR. "Assisted Return by Province of Destination." *AIMS*. Mar 2008b. [http://www.aims.org.af/services/sectoral/emergency\\_assistance/refugee/unhcr\\_summaries/mar\\_08/summary2.pdf](http://www.aims.org.af/services/sectoral/emergency_assistance/refugee/unhcr_summaries/mar_08/summary2.pdf) (accessed Dec 23, 2008).

—. "Assisted Voluntary Repatriation to Afghanistan Returns by District of Destination." *UNHCR*. 2008. <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=SUBSITES&id=491862832> (accessed 12 12, 2008).

—. "Farza District Profile." *AIMS*. May 9, 2002. [http://www.aims.org.af/afg/dist\\_profiles/unhcr\\_district\\_profiles/centra/kabul/farza.pdf](http://www.aims.org.af/afg/dist_profiles/unhcr_district_profiles/centra/kabul/farza.pdf) (accessed 12 30, 2008).

—. "Operational Information Monthly Summary Report Part 1 – March 08." *AIMS*. Mar 2008. [http://www.aims.org.af/services/sectoral/emergency\\_assistance/refugee/unhcr\\_summaries/mar\\_08/summary1.pdf](http://www.aims.org.af/services/sectoral/emergency_assistance/refugee/unhcr_summaries/mar_08/summary1.pdf) (accessed Dec 23, 2008).

UNODC. "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008." *UNODC*. Aug 2008. [http://www.unodc.org/documents/publications/Afghanistan\\_Opium\\_Survey\\_2008.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/publications/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf) (accessed Dec 30, 2008).

—. "Illicit Drug Trends in Afghanistan." *UNODC*. Jun 2008. [http://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Illicit%20Drug%20Trends%20Report\\_Afg%2013%20June%202008.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Illicit%20Drug%20Trends%20Report_Afg%2013%20June%202008.pdf) (accessed Dec 23, 2008).

Walsh, Declan. "Dark pasts of Afghans are kept quiet." *The Boston Globe*. Jun 16, 2006.

[http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2006/06/16/dark\\_pasts\\_of\\_afghans\\_are\\_kept\\_quiet/?page=2](http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2006/06/16/dark_pasts_of_afghans_are_kept_quiet/?page=2) (accessed Dec 19, 2008).